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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 14233 
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for livestock loss and property 
damage sustained by defendant which defendant alleges was caused 
by plaintiff's sale to it of salmonella contaminated livestock 
feed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury upon defendant's 
Counterclaim and trial proceeded upon the theories of express 
and implied warranty. Defendant appeals to this Court from the 
verdict directed against it upon its Counterclaim. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the directed verdict "j 
entered against it and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties will be identified as they were at trial. 
The appellant, Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., will be identifiec 
throughout as defendant and the respondent, Utah Cooperative 
Association, will be identified throughout as plaintiff, 
i The facts at issue in this action focus upon the 
condition of hog feed processed and sold by plaintiff to defendant 
during June, 1973. 
Defendant is a close corporation hog farm located in 
the proximate vicinity of Spanish Fork, Utah. During 1973, sole 
ownership and management of the farm was vested in Paul F. 
Haderlie, Howard B. Egbert, and his wife, Rita Egbert. The hog 
farm is income producing and directed solely toward the breeding 
and marketing of the registered, purebred Duroc pig as both 
breeding stock and fattened hogs (Tr. at 6, 77). During 1973, 
the herd size averaged 280 - 300 head in size, of which 45 were 
sows (Tr. at 4). Defendant maintains a continuous, year around 
farrowing program which it conducts within a modern hog house 
building divided into a farrowing unit and nursery unit (Tr. at 
7 - 1 0 ; defendant's exhibits 1 - 1 1 ) . The physical plant, 
facilities and housekeeping procedures of the defendant medically 
qualify the operation as one bordering upon a specific, pathogen-
free hog farm (Tr. at 192). 
-2-
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by defendant in one of four weather tight two ton capacity 
storage bins (Tr. at 18). Defendant's rate of feed consumption 
averaged somewhat in excess of two tons~of feed for each two 
weeks (Tr. at 18). 
Whenever changes were made to any of the three feed 
formulaej defendant met with the Orem feed mill employees and 
there solicited their opinion of the formulae's suitability and/tt 
price at which the feed could be accordingly processed. (Tr. at 
16, 77). Throughout all transactions between plaintiff and 
defendant there was an agreement that the grains supplied by 
plaintiff were of good quality and that the processed hog feed 
was of similar good quality (Tr. at 77). 
A written mixing order was prepared by plaintiff's 
Orem feed mill personnel in response to each order for hog feed 
made by defendant (Tr.. at 16, 77). The ingredients and blending 
proportions written on each mixing order were made to always confc 
to the hog feed formulaes submitted by defendant (Tr. at 16, 77; 
plaintiff's exhibit 59). 
On June 25, 1973 defendant placed with the Orem feed mil 
an order for five tons of hog feed, which order included one ton 
of the 16% lactation ration (Tr. at 2 1 - 2 2 ; plaintiff's exhibits 
59, 60). The hog feed formulae governing this order were the 
same as had been followed by the feed mill during the preceding 
three to four months (Tr. at 22). As done since 1971, defendant 
delivered to the mill the required number of 50 pound sacks of 
Mr. Meaty Mix (Tr. at 21). Written mixing orders were accordingl: 
prepared by the feed mill conforming to the directives of the 
submitted feed formulae . (Tr. at 21; plaintiff's exhibit 60). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Orem feed mill made delivery of the five ton bulk load to 
defendant's farm on June 27, 1975 and placed the bulk load into 
defendant's storage bins (Tr. at 22). -Paul Haderlie visually 
examined the hog feed upon its delivery to the farm and while the 
load was still in plaintiff's bulk delivery trucks (Tr. at 84). 
Defendant began feeding from this bulk load on either the 27th 
or 28th day of June, 1973 (Tr. at 23). On June 29, 1973 
Paul Haderlie observed that the weaner and feeder hogs in the 
nursery (20 pounds to 60 pounds) were "rooting" the 16% lactation 
ration pellets out of the self-feeders, and onto the floor 
(Tr. at 23). Believing the cause to be some contamination in the 
self-feeders, the hopper units on the feeders were emptied of feed, 
cleaned, and refilled with more 16% lactation ration (Tr. at 23). 
Haderlie checked these same hogs the next day and once again 
observed that the feed was being rooted out of the self-feeders 
rather than being eaten (Tr. at 23). Egbert and Haderlie advised 
the manager of plaintiff's Orem. mill on June 29, 1973 that some-
thing was wrong with the feed delivered. The feed was inspected 
July 2, 1973 directly from defendant's storage bins by the field 
representative from the Orem mill together with Iladerlie (Tr. at 
49) . Haderlie accordingly advised this employee that the hor* feed 
pellets were of a dark, off-color appearance and emitted an odor 
rather than the fresh smell customarily emitted from the grains 
composing this pellet feed (Tr. at 41). The agreement from this 
July 2, 1973 meeting was that the involved five tons of pellet hog 
feed would be picked up and replaced by the Orem. feed mill 
(Tr. at 43). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By July 3, 1973 approximately 207o of defendant's hog •-.» 
herd had developed scours (diarrhea) (Tr. at 46). On this same 
day Haderlie ordered from Leland Milling Company, Spanish Fork, 
Utah, two tons of hog feed in 100 pound bags as partial replacemei 
for the five ton delivery from plaintiff, which load continued 
to remain in defendant's feed bins (Tr. at 45, 64). An 
additional two tons of replacement feed was ordered and delivered 
from Leland Mills on July 7, 1973 (Tr. at 45, 64). This latter 
order was delivered in bulk to defendant's farm. Defendant create 
storage space for this delivery by emptying from one bin the 
approximate 1,300 pounds of 16% lactation feed remaining from the 
plaintiff's initial two ton delivery of this ration (Tr. at 44, 
118 - 119). The feed processed by plaintiff was sold by it to a 
third party and removed from defendant's farm by this person on 
the afternoon of July 7, 1973 (Tr. at 45). This person reported 
no adverse consequences from feeding this feed to his hogs. 
The hog feed ordered from Leland Milling Company was 
processed under the same feed formula as the hog feed processed b} 
plaintiff's Orem feed mill (Tr. at 119). Fifty pound bags of 
Mr. Meaty Mix were similarly supplied by defendant to Leland 
Milling Company as had been done with the Orem mill (Tr, at 119). 
The Mr. Meaty Mix bags delivered to Leland Milling Company bore 
the same lot number identification as those delivered to the Orem 
feed mill on June 25, 1973 (Tr. at 201). The hog feed processed 
by Leland Milling Company was accepted and consumed by defendant's 
hogs (Tr. at 203). 
On July 6, 1973 the outbreak of scours in defendant's 
hogs was examined and initially treated by Dr. Jon F. Hunter, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU  
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a Spanish Fork veterinarian (Tr. at 155). Hunter himself confirmed 
the off-color appearance of the hog feed processed by plaintiff and 
the hog1s rejection of it (Tr. at 155 - 156). The hogs were 
placed on a broad spectrum medication to treat Hunter's prelimin-
ary diagnosis of severe diarrhea (Tr. at 156). Feed samples and 
fecal samples were taken by Dr. Hunter on his initial July 6, 1973 
visit (Tr. at 157). Two feed samples were taken by Hunter from 
each of defendant's three hog feed rations then present in the 
steel storage bins (Tr. at 94 - 95, 158). Each feed sample was 
taken in plastic, sterile whirl pack bags and each fecal sample 
was taken with a sterile swab stick and placed within a sterile 
transport media (Tr. at 157). The fecal samples and one set of 
feed samples taken on July 6, 1973 were mailed by Dr. Hunter to 
the U. S. Department of Agriculture Research Laboratory (Tr. at 
161). These laboratory tests reported no salmonella detected 
in any of the feed samples and the presence of salmonella 
enteriditis in all fecal samples (Tr. at 161). The results were 
utilized by Hunter to conclude that the scours in the hogs were 
caused by the salmonella pathogen. Hunter's medication schedule 
was changed accordingly (Tr. at 162, 179). Within this same 
span of time, feed samples were similarly sent by defendant to 
the Office of the State Chemist, Utah State Department of 
Agriculture and to Omaha Testing Laboratories, Inc., Omaha, 
Nebraska (Tr. at 90, 121; plaintiff's exhibit 85). The Office 
of the State Chemist detected no salmonella in the feed samples 
tested by it (plaintiff's exhibit 85). The Omaha, Nebraska 
laboratory reported salmonella present in the 16% lactation ration 
sample and no salmonella present in the remaining two grain 
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samples (Tr. at 121). Unlike the grain sample taken by Dr. 
Hunter, the grain samples sent to Omaha, Nebraska were taken 
by Paul Haderlie and mailed by him alone. These samples were 
taken from burlap bags which had been stored for some two weeks 
in Egbert's Provo, Utah garage subsequent to being filled from 
the feed storage bins by Haderlie on July 6, 1973 (Tr. at 91 - 91 
On August 14, 1973 Hunter mailed the second set of grain samples 
taken by him on July 6, 1973, together with recently taken fecal 
samples to Intermountain Laboratories, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah 
(Tr. at 162 - 163). The testing results of Intermountain 
Laboratories, Inc., identified salmonella enteriditis (group E) ir 
six of the seven submitted pig fecal samples (defendant's 
exhibits 62 - 65; Tr. at 134 - 137). Of the three feed samples 
submitted, the laboratory reported abundant enterococci group D 
strep present in the fattening ration sample, and moderate 
salmonella (group E) together with a few enterococci group D strej 
present in the 1670 lactation ration sample (Tr. at 136 - 137). 
Normal flora was reported for the gestation ration sample. With 
the results from Intermountain Laboratories, Inc., Hunter'once 
again changed his medication schedule (Tr. at 179). From 
July 6, 1973, and into the first week of August, 42 of defendant's 
hogs, ranging in size from 20 pounds to 60 pounds, died from 
scours (Tr. at 58). The scours in defendant's hogs was brought 
largely under control by the first week of August but continued 
to be present into September, 1973 (Tr. at 46, 62). The presence 
of scours in defendant's hogs required defendant to hold 175 hogs 
45 days beyond the time in which these hogs would have been 
customarily marketed. The presence of scours disrupted the 
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weight gain regimen of defendant's feeding program so that these 
hogs had not achieved their 200 pound marketing size within the 
customary 5 1/2 month fattening period _(Tr. at 49 - 54). 
On September 5, 1973, defendant evacuated the farrowing and 
nursery hog house upon the medical recommendation of Dr. Hunter 
so that the building and equipment could be chemically disinfected 
and steam cleaned (Tr. at 169). Eight sows with their litters 
were moved outside. The absence of outside farrowing facilities 
of the type within the farrowing house resulted in the death of 
24 suckling pigs (Tr. at 62 - 63, 105). 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's arguments in this brief are confined to the . 
law governing a trial court in ruling upon a party's motion for 
directed verdict under URCP 50(a)(as amended 1965). The 
controlling principle is that the court must examine the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion 
is made and must resolve every controverted fact in its favor., 
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P2d 302 (1971). In 
ruling upon a directed verdict, the court is vested with no 
discretion to weigh or determine the preponderance of the evidence., 
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P2d 491 (1952). 
Defendant urges that the elements of the strict 
liability warranty action measured against the evidence within 
its case in chief preclude the award of a directed verdict against 
it upon its Counterclaim. 
The following statements are directed to the elements 
of the strict liability breach of warranty action. These 
statements are organized at this point in the brief to facilitate Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
organization and to avoid repetition. 
A breach of warranty action commenced under the Utah I 
Uniform Commercial Code is premised upon strict liability. This 
form of liability focuses solely upon the condition of the product 
and makes immaterial the quality of care utilized by the 
supplier in the design, manufacture and disbribution of the 
product. White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 271-2 (1972). 
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Jordan, 
254 So2d 17 (Fla App 1971)(10 UCC Rep 982). The converse of this 
statement is that concepts of fault and negligence as defined by 
negligence standards have no place in warranty cases. 
2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability. §16.01 (1)(1974). 
The defendant's burden in this warranty action is to -i 
establish: 
1. The existence of a warranty; and t 
2. That the warranty was breached by the defective or 
nonconforming condition of the product; and 
3. That the defendant suffered loss as a proximate 
result of the breach., see, Official Comment 13 to UCC §2-314. 
Proof that the warranty was breached requires defendant 
to affirmatively establish that the product was in a defective 
condition at the time it left plaintiff's possession and control. 
Hagenbuck v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 
339 FSupp 676, 10 UCC Rep 1005 (NH 1972); Lucchesi v. H. C. Bohack 
Co., Inc., 8 UCC Rep 326 (NY Sup Ct 1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the question of the 
existence of a warranty, whether it was breached, and whether the 
breach was the proximate cause of the alleged losses are issues Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of fact for jury determination. 
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift, 
525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974): This holding by the 
Utah Supreme Court delineating the function between the Court and 
jury in a warranty action applies the majority rule, see, 
McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co., 
295 So2d 707 (Fla App 1974) 15 UCC Rep 375; Guardian Insurance 
Co. v. Anacostia, 320 A2d 315, 14 UCC Rep 1125 (DC App 1974); 
Judd Construction Co. v. Bob Post, Inc., 
516 P2d 449, 13 UCC Rep 800 (Colo App 1973); Paglia v. Chrysler 
Corp., 327 NYS2d 978, 10 UCC Rep 304 (1972); Sinka v. Northern 
Commercial Co., 491 P2d 116, 9 UCC Rep 1350 (Alaska 1971); 
Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 
382 F2d 395, 4 UCC Rep 681 (10th Cir 1967). 
The exclusive use of circumstantial evidence to establish 
both breach of warranty and that the breach was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's losses has been expressly approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 Utah 279, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971); accord, 
Paglia v. Chrysler Corp., 327 NYS2d 978, 10 UCC Rep 304 (1972); 
Colorado Serum Co. v. Arp, 504 P2d 801, 11 UCC Rep 1152 (Wyo 1972); 
General Supply & Equipment Co. v. Phillips, 
490 SW2d 913, 12 UCC Rep 35 (Tex Civ App 1972); 
Guardian Insurance Co v. Anacostia Chrysler, 
320 A2d 315, 14 UCC Rep 1125 (DC App 1974); McCarthy v. Florida 
Ladder Co., 295 So2d 707, 15 UCC Rep 375 (Fla App 1974). 
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The use of circumstantial evidence to establish a bread 
of warranty proximately causing loss does not require that the j 
plaintiff exclude every other possible cause. 
McMiller Feeds, Inc. v. Dale Harlow, 
405 SW2d 123 (Tex Civ App 1966). Circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to show a product causally defective if the probative 
facts allow the jury to logically and reasonably conclude that 
the greater probability of truth lies with the conclusion 
sought by plaintiff. Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971). 
The standard against which the quality of circumstantial 
evidence is measured in a breach of warranty case is defined in' 
Holokwa v. York Farm Bureau, 
81 York LR 118, CCH Prod Liab Rptr Par 5855 (Penn 1967). 
We have said many times that the jury may not be j 
permitted to reach its verdict on the basis of 
speculation or conjecture but that there must 
be evidence upon which its conclusion may be 
based. . . . It means only that the evidence 
presented must be such that by reasoning from it, 
without resort to prejudice or guess a jury can 
reach the conclusion sought by plaintiff, and 
not that the conclusions must be the ONLY one " . 
which can be logically reached. •...-.•• . It is not 
necessary that . . . every fact or circumstance 
point unerringly to liability; it is enough that 
there be sufficient facts for the jury to say 
reasonably that the preponderance favors liability. 
(Emphasis theirs) 
CCH"Prod Liab Rptr Par 5855 at 7992. 
The law in Utah is that contributory negligence is not 
a defense to liability in a breach of warranty case in the sense 
of failing to discover or failing to guard against the defect in 
the product. The Utah Supreme Court, however, has expressly held 
that the form of contributory negligence which consists of 
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known and 
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appreciated danger is a defense in a strict liability warranty 
action. Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971). 
Hence, if the buyer is fully aware of the dangers of the product 
and nonetheless proceeds voluntarily to make use of the product 
and suffers loss from its use, he is barred from recovery. 
9 UCC Rep at 781. The Utah Court has accordingly held that this 
form of improper conduct against the plaintiff is one which must 
be affirmatively proved. 9 UCC Rep. at 781. 
POINT I 
THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND QUALITY WERE IMPOSED UPON 
PLAINTIFF BY ITS SALE OF PROCESSED HOG FEED TO DEFENDANT. 
The express and implied warranties created by plaintiff's 
sale of processed hog feed to defendant will be considered in four 
parts. Part A will consider the creation of express warranties 
by plaintiff-seller. Part B will focus upon the creation of 
implied warranties within the June 25, 1973 sales transaction. 
Part C will evaluate the legal effect of buyer requirements and 
specifications upon the creation of express and implied warranties. 
Part D will examine plaintiff's argument that it cannot be liable 
under UCC warranty law if the original host for the salmonella was 
the Mr. Meaty Mix feed supplement. 
Some preliminary clarification is required at this 
point to define properly defendant's warranty argument. Defendant 
urges that the written mixing order prepared by the plaintiff's 
Orem feed mill on June 25, 1973 created express and implied 
warranties that the hog feed processed by it would conform to the 
description contained therein. The warranties created necessarily Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made nonconforming and unwholesome any hog feed contaminated by . \ 
salmonella. 
Part A. UCA §70A-2-313 defines when express warranties 
are created in the sale of goods. 
The express warranty language of §70A-2-313(l)(b) 
provides in relevant part: 
Any description of the goods which is made part 
of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description . . . 
Official Comment 1 to UCC §2-313 clarifies when express 
warranties by description become part of the ffbasis of the 
bargain11 as follows: 
"Express11 warranties rest on "dickered11 aspects 
of the individual bargain and go so clearly 
to the essence of that bargain that words of 
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic 
dickered terms. (Quotation marks theirs) 
When the seller gives a "description of the goods" 
is found in Official Comment 5: 
A description need not be by words. Technical 
specifications, blueprints and the like can 
afford more exact description than mere language 
and if made part of the basis of the bargain 
goods must conform with them. Past deliveries 
may set the description of quality, either 
expressly or impliedly by course of dealing . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court expressly approved and applied the 
language of Official Comment 5 to UCC §2-313 in Pacific Marine 
Schwabacher v. Hydroswift, 525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974) 
The Hydroswift holding focused upon a small acrylic plastic boat 
manufactured and sold by the defendant. The defendant displayed 
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construction processes. The Court cited UCA §70A-2-313 to conclude 
that defendant's display of these acrylic pieces created express 
warranties by both "description" and "sample". The Court held 
that the defendant breached its express warranties when the 
acrylic materials within the delivered boats did not conform to 
the molded acrylic pieces. 15 UCC Rep 359. The Utah Court 
similarly found a breach of an express warranty by description 
i n
 Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P2d 602, 15 UCC Rep 1082 (Utah 1974). 
This Court held that a written livestock sale agreement identifying 
the breed, sex, and age of the cattle to be sold constituted 
"a description of the goods" and hence an express warranty within 
UCA §70A-2-313(l)(b), 15 UCC Rep at 1083. The Court found this 
express warranty was breached when the livestock delivered were 
not those described in the contract of sale. 
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, supra., and Lamb, supra., 
follow the command of UCA §70A-2-313(2), that the creation of an 
express warranty does not require the seller's specific intent 
to make a warranty. 
The holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific 
Marine Schwabacher, supra., and Lamb, supra., make clear that 
the June 25, 1973 written mixing order prepared by plaintiff's 
Orem feed mill was "a description of the goods" when measured by 
UCA §70A-2-313(l)(b). The mixing order similarly represented the 
"basis of the bargain" between the parties. Defendant's 
June 25, 1973 order for hog feed was made pursuant to a submitted 
ration formula as had been all orders by it since 1971. As with 
each purchase order transaction between the parties since 1971, 
the mixing order of June 25, 1973 was the feed mill's confirmation Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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j 
that the processed hog feed would conform to the mixing order 
description. 
The conclusion follows that the mixing order prepared 
by plaintiff's feed mill on June 23, 1973 created an express 
warranty that the hog feed would conform to its blending 
description. 
Part B. Defendant urges that warranties of merchant-
ability were implied within the June 25, 1973 hog feed transactior 
§70A-2-314(l) provides, 
.
 c . Unless excluded or modified (70A-2-316), 
a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable 
is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of 
that kind. 
The record is clear that the June 25, 1973 transaction 
was a contract for the sale of processed hog feed. The written 
mixing order contemplated the sale of a hog feed product only. 
Similarly, plaintiff imposed one price only for this product whict 
price was that for a processed hog feed. There is likewise no 
dispute that the Orem feed mill made plaintiff a "merchant" with 
respect to the sale of grains, feed supplements, and processed 
livestock feeds. (see, Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim and 
Reply) Lastly, the only writings which evidenced the June 25, 19' 
transaction were plaintiff!s written mixing order and its 
subsequent billing statements. None of these writings contained 
any language excluding or modifying the warranties implied in the 
sale of the involved hog feed. The standards of §70A-2-314(l) 
compel the conclusion that warranties of merchantability were 
implied in the June 25, 1973 hog feed transaction. 
The meaning of the "merchantability" obligations impost 
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upon plaintiff are defined in §70A-2-314(2): 
. . . Goods to be merchantable must be at 
least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade 
under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are 
of fair average quality within the 
the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes 
for which such goods are used; . . • 
The implied warranties of merchantability within 
§70A-2-314 arise without regard to party intent and their creation 
is not dependent upon particular action or language. Comment 1 
to UCC 2-315. The function of the implied warranty is to place 
the burden of loss on the seller when inferior goods do not conform 
to normal commercial standards of safety and effectiveness. 
Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
6 Conn Cir Ct 478, 8 UCC Rep 668 (1970). 
As with the creation of §70A-2-313 express warranties, 
the "contract description" and "description" language of 
§70A-2-314(2) was implemented by the terms and specifications 
of plaintiff's June 25, 1973 written mixing order. 
Part C. Plaintiff argued at trial that defendant's 
feed formulae constituted buyer requirements and specifications 
which excluded the creation of any express and implied warranties. 
This argument mistates the law. 
Comment 3 to UCC 2-314 defines the legal relationship 
between buyer requirements and the warranty of merchantability 
implied in a contract for the sale of goods. This Comment states, 
A specific designation of goods by the 
buyer does not exclude the seller's obligation 
that they be fit for the general purposes 
appropriate to such goods. . . . 
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Comment 9 to UCC §2-316 further defines the relationship 
between buyer requirements and the attachment of express and 
implied warranties to a contract for the sale of goods: 
The situation in which the buyer gives 
precise and complete specifications to the seller 
is . . . a frequent circumstance by which the 
implied warranties may be excluded. . . . The 
(implied) warranty of merchantability in such a 
transaction . . . must be considered in 
connection with the next section (e.g., UCC 2-317) 
on the cumulation and conflict of warranties. 
Under paragraph (c) of that section in case of 
such an inconsistency the implied warranty of 
merchantability is displaced by the express 
warranty that the goods will comply with the 
specifications. Thus, where the buyer gives 
detailed specifications as to the goods, neither 
of the implied warranties as to quality will 
normally apply to the transactions unless 
consistent with the specifications. (Deletions 
and emphasis mine) 
The quoted Comments make clear that a buyerTs precise 
and complete specifications to the seller do not exclude an expres 
warranty by the seller that the goods will conform to the 
specifications where such specifications are made part of .the basi 
of the bargain between the parties. The result follows that who 
provides the specifications and why is not a material inquiry wit! 
a §70A-2-313 express warranty action. Part A of this Argument has 
established that plaintiff's written mixing order was a 
"description of the goods11 which was "made a part of the basis of 
the bargain" between the parties. An express warranty was 
accordingly created. 
The quoted Comments likewise establish that warranties 
of merchantability are implied in buyer requirement sales 
transactions consistent with those specifications made part of t\ 
basis of the bargain. UCA §70A-2-317 confirms this result by 
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subordinating inconsistent implied warranties to the terms of the 
express warranty. The implied warranty of merchantability 
provisions of UCA §70A~2-314(2)(a),(b),^(c) have been demonstrated 
to apply to this action. Their application is both cumulative 
to and consistent with the express warranty by description created 
from the specifications of plaintiff's mixing order. 
Case law confirms that implied warranties of 
merchantability are created in those situations where the buyer 
has given precise and complete specifications to the seller. 
In Kasab v. Central Soya, 
432 Pa 217 246 A2d 848, 5 UCC Rep 925 (1968), plaintiffs: 
were engaged in the business of breeding purebred cattle. The 
plaintiffs placed an order for cattle feed with the defendant 
feed mill, Pritts. The purchase order contained a ration 
formula previously blended by the defendant. The court concluded 
without extensive analysis that the specifications of the 
plaintiff-buyer did not displace or modify the implied warranties 
of merchantability. The court found that the livestock feed was 
contaminated and that the implied warranties had been breached for 
the reason that the feed as mixed did not conform to the mixture 
ordered. 
In Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 
294 F Supp 649, 5 UCC Rep 1219 (Pa 1968), the plaintiff had 
entered into a contract of sale for a sophisticated oil compound 
to be utilized within its manufacturing program. The product \>zas 
developed by the defendant to meet the requirements and 
specifications designated by plaintiff. A delivery of this oil 
product to plaintiff was found by the court to be nonconforming. 
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The court held that the specifications and requirements submitted 
by the plaintiff, when accepted by the defendant, created an , 
express warranty that the oil product would accordingly conform. 
The court found that this express warranty created by the 
defendant was breached. The court further found that implied 
warranties of merchantability were created consistent with the 
creation of the express warranties. In holding that the implied 
warranties of merchantability had been breached the court rejected 
the defendant's arguments that the specifications submitted by 
the plaintiff excluded the imposition of implied warranties of 
merchantability to the sales transaction. 
The case of Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc. 
v. Worthington Corp., 300 A2d 231, 11 UCC Rep 963 (Del Super 1972) 
involved sales transactions in which the defendants contracted to 
build and design a boat in accordance with specifications and 
plans submitted by the plaintiff buyer. The court rejected the 
defendant's argument that no express warranties and implied 
warranties of merchantability could attach to the sale. In 
holding that express warranties by description and consistent 
implied warranties of merchantability were created in the sales 
transaction, the Court expressly acknowledged that the 
specifications and plans submitted by the plaintiff-buyer did not 
per se exclude warranty merchantability. 
In Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co., 
459 F2d 133, 10 UCC Rep 539 (2d Cir 1972), the court found 
implied warranties of merchantability to have been created and 
breached as a matter of law when a large galvanizing kettle 
cracked and collapsed. The galvanizing kettle had been manufact Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the defendant in accordance with inside dimensions specified 
by the plaintiff buyer. 
The result follows that the feed formulas submitted by 
the defendant to plaintiff's Orem feed mill did not exclude an 
express warranty that the processed hog feed would confrom to 
the specifications of the June 25, 1973 mixing order. Consistent 
with this express warranty, a cumulative implied warranty of 
merchantability attached to the June 25, 1973 sales transaction. 
Part D. One of plaintiff's defenses at trial was that 
the salmonella present in the involved bulk load of hog feed 
originated in the feed supplement, Mr. Meaty Mix. Mr. Meaty Mix 
was the only ingredient in the hog feed that was not sold and 
supplied by plaintiff. Plaintiff urged that the warranty provisions 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code applied only to contracts for 
the sale of goods and that consequently it could incur no UCC 
warranty liability if the believable weight of evidence placed the 
origin of the salmonella in the Mr. Meaty Mix. Defendant submits 
that plaintiff's argument misapplies the law because it denies 
that the June 25, 1973 transaction was nothing more nor less than 
one contract for the sale of bulk load processed hog feed. 
Defendant argues that the strict liability warranty action 
requires only that it show by the believable weight of the 
evidence that the involved load of hog feed was contaminated 
with salmonella at the time the load left plaintiff's control for 
delivery to defendant. Conversely, defendant has no burden upon 
it to show which ingredient within the hog feed was the 
original host for the salmonella, to include the Mr. Meaty Mix 
supplement. Acceptance of plaintiff's argument would require this Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court to sever the June 25, 1973 transaction into three distinct 
transactions — plaintiff's sale of ingredients to plaintiff, -
defendant's supply of Mr. Meaty Mix to plaintiff, and plaintiff's 
processing for defendant of all the ingredients into a bulk load 
of pellet hog feed. Plaintiff's attempt to avoid warranty 
liability by breaking the subject commercial transaction into its 
sale and service elements is contrary to the law. The courts have 
uniformly refused to isolate and itemize the elements of a 
commercial transaction In each instance, the courts have looked 
to the predominant feature of the commercial transaction in order 
to establish its legal identity. The courts determine the 
predominant feature of the transaction by looking to the intent 
of the parties and the circumstances in which they are dealing. 
Epstein v. Giammattasio, 197 A2d 342, 1 UCC Rep 114 (Conn C P 196 
(defective hairdressing supplies part of beauty salon treatment 
held subject of contract was one for rendition of services and no 
one for sale of goods.) Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor & Sons, Inc. 
2 UCC Rep 1148 (Conn Cir 1964)(beauty salon treatment essentially 
a transaction for services — materials used in performance of 
such services incidental to predominant purpose of transaction.) 
The insistence of the courts to look only to the transaction as 
a whole and to identify it by its predominating feature is furth* 
evidenced in actions focusing upon building construction contraci 
In Busch v. Aluminum Metal Products, 
8 UCC Rep 335 (NY Sup Ct 1970)., the court rejected plaintiff's 
argument that a kitchen remodeling contract was essentially one 
sale of the appliances, floor covering, cabinets and formica 
covering. The court looked to the controlling feature of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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transaction and found the contract to be one for services. 
The Pennsylvania courts have similarly found that a 
contract to construct a home is not a contract for the sale of 
bricks, roofing, etc., used in construction. DeMatteo v. White, 
16 UCC Rep 926 (Pa Super Ct 1975). 
The most articulated body of case law representing the 
court's insistence to identify a transaction by its essential 
and primary objective is found in the blood transfusion cases. 
see, Dibblee v. D. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 
12 Utah2d 241, 364 P2d 1085 (1961). The results of these cases 
are split as to whether the supplying of blood for value incident 
to the medical treatment and hospitalization of the patient is 
a contract for the sale of goods or one for the rendition of 
services. The prevailing rationale of all of these cases is to 
the main object and purpose of the transaction incident to 
characterizing as one predicated upon service or sale. see, 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 
308 NY 100, 123 NE2d 792 (1954)(blood transfusion incident to 
rendition of services)., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 
47 I112d 443, 266 NE2d 897 (19 )(blood transfusion a sale). 
The case law cited above supports defendant's argument 
that the June 25, 1973 hog feed transaction was one for the sale 
of processed hog feed only. The case law confirms defendant's 
argument that no obligation is imposed upon it by the strict 
warranty liability action to isolate which ingredient within the 
hog feed was the original host for the salmonella. This latter 
rule of law applies to the Mr. Meaty Mix supplement as well as to 
any other ingredient blended by plaintiff into the hog feed. 
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Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 Utah2d 269, 488 P2d 302, 9 UCC Rep 777 (1971)(proof of specific 
defect not required in UCC warranty action). 
In conclusion, the court erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion for a directed verdict for the reasons that the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the existence of warranty is an issue 
of fact for jury determination. Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. 
v. Hydroswift, 525 P2d 615, 15 UCC Rep 354 (Utah 1974). Plaintiff 
case in chief provided ample factual confirmation that an express 
warranty of description and consistent implied warranties of 
merchantability attached to the June 25, 1973 hog feed 
transaction. 
POINT II 
THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED 
NO EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND QUALITY 
BY ITS SALE OF CONTAMINATED PROCESSED HOG FEED TO DEFENDANT. 
Defendant contends that the presence of salmonella 
in the hog feed delivery of June 27, 19.73 constituted a breach 
of plaintiff's express and implied warranties. Defendant's 
evidence at trial was, (A) that salmonella had contaminated 
the subject hog feed prior to plaintifffs delivery of the feed 
to defendant's farm, (B) that the salmonella was introduced int 
the feed because of fecal contamination in the feed, and (C) th 
the hog's consumption of this feed caused the scours epidemic in 
the hogs. 
The evidence set forth below is that developed by 
defendant at trial to establish that plaintiff breached its 
express and implied warranties. 
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borders on a pathogen free operation. This qualitative conclusion 
was made by Dr. Hunter and was supported by the testimony of 
Dr. Claire Accord, livestock specialist* Utah State University 
Extension Service. Prior to the June 25, 1973 transaction, 
defendant's experience with scours in its hogs had been 
minimal and in all instances had been confined to the suckling 
pigs (Tr. at 120 - 121; 153 - 154). The scours in these 
suckling hogs had in all instances been caused by nutritional 
changes in the milk of the sows (Tr. at 86 - 87). None of the 
defendant's hogs prior to June 25, 1973 had ever incurred scours 
resulting from the salmonella pathogen (Tr. at 153 - 154). 
Moreover, the number of suckling hogs affected at any given time 
with nutritional scours had always been less than 1% of defendant's 
hogs (Tr. at 86 - 87; 154). Defendant's experience with scours 
in its hogs following September, 1973 to the time of trial was 
identical to the events and circumstances prior to June, 1973 
(Tr. 87, 172). 
The events material to this action occurred from 
June 25, 1973 to the end of September, 1973. During this* . 
approximate three month interval, 20% of defendant's hogs became 
afflicted with scours (Tr. at 87). Unlike any time prior or 
since, the age group of the hogs affected were the weaner and 
feeder pigs — 20 pounds to 60 pounds (Tr. at 87). Unlike any 
time prior or since, defendant sustained death losses from scours 
in this size group and the death losses were substantial 
(Tr. at 58, 87, 153 - 154). Unlike any time prior or since, 
this scour epidemic was caused by the salmonella pathogen 
(Tr. at 153 - 154). 
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Dr. Jon F. Hunter testified at trial that it was his 
expert medical* opinion that the June through September scours 
epidemic in defendant's hogs was caused-by the salmonella 
pathogen (Tr. at 162). Dr. Hunter's conclusion was derived 
preliminarily from the tests results of the U. S. Department of 
Agriculture Research Laboratory showing salmonella present in all 
fecal samples submitted to it by Dr. Hunter (Tr. at 161). Dr. 
Hunterfs medical opinion was also that the salmonella pathogen 
originated in the bulk load of pellet hog feed delivered to 
defendant on June 27, 1973 and that the salmonella was already 
present in the feed upon delivery (Tr. at 168, 194). The hogs 
consequently contracted the salmonella and resulting scours 
epidemic after being fed from this bulk load of feed on either 
June 27 or 28, 1973 (Tr. at 23). Dr. Hunter's opinion that the 
subject load of hog feed was the source of the salmonella causing 
the scours epidemic was derived in part from the feed sample test 
results received by Dr. Hunter from Intermountain Laboratories 
(Tr. at 165 - 168). The feed sample test results confirmed 
salmonella present in one of the three feed samples submitted. 
(Tr. at 136 - 137; 163 - 165). Similarly, the fecal sample resul' 
confirmed salmonella present in six of the seven submitted sample 
(Tr. at 134, 166). Dr. Hunter confirmed that all samples were 
taken pursuant to good medical procedure thereby eliminating 
cross-contamination between samples (Tr. at 166). Dr. Paul 
Derrick testified that he was the chief microbiologist at 
Intermountain Laboratories and was responsible for the accuracy 
of the feed sample and fecal sample test results described above 
(Tr. at 132 - 133, 137; defendant's exhibits 63 - 72). 
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Dr. Derrick reported the presence of the pathogen enterococci 
group D strep in two of the three submitted feed samples 
(Tr. at 136 - 137). The medical significance of the presence of 
this pathogen in two of the three feed samples was confirmed 
uniformly by Dr. Hunter and Dr. Derrick. Both men identified 
enterococci group D strip as an organism growing in the tract of 
man and animals (Tr. at 136 - 137). Both men confirmed that the 
presence of this organism in the hog feed demonstrated that the 
hog feed had been contaminated with fecal material (Tr. at 136, 
168). The connection between fecal material in the hog feed with 
the salmonella pathogen was defined by both Dr. Derrick and 
Dr. Hunter. Their medical conclusion was that salmonella can 
exist in cereal based feed products only if the involved grain 
ingredients are first fecally contaminated (Tr. at 144, 147, 182) 
The presence of the enterococci group D strep organism in the 
feed samples was relied upon by Dr. Hunter to medically conclude 
that the salmonella contamination in the involved bulk load of 
pellet hog feed was the result of foreign fecal material in the 
feed (Tr. at 168, 193), Dr. Hunter's conclusion was likewise 
that this fecal material was present in the hog feed prior to its • 
delivery to defendant (Tr. at 194). 
Dr. Hunter's conclusion of fecal material in the hog 
feed as the host for the salmonella pathogen and that this 
condition was present prior to delivery was based upon evaluation 
criteria going beyond laboratory test results. Dr. Hunter's 
opinion was in part based upon his personal examination of 
defendant's farm and hogs on July 6, 1973. Dr. Hunter, as had 
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Paul Haderlie, examined on this day the subject hog feed and 
visually noted its off-color appearance (Tr. at 38 - 39, 
155 - 156). At the same time, Dr. Hunter confirmed from Paul 
Haderlie that the feed emitted a bad odor and individually 
confirmed that the hogs were l!rootingl! this feed out of the 
feeder and onto the floor (Tr. at 39, 155 - 156). Dr. Hunter 
then eliminated, with reasonable medical certainty, the hogs1 
water supply, air contamination, and recently purchased hogs as 
contamination sources (Tr. at 168). As of July 6, 1973 '., 
Dr. Hunter had preliminarily isolated the involved bulk load of 
hog feed as the source of the scours epidemic and had done so 
independently of laboratory testing (Tr. at 174 - 178). 
Dr. Hunter's conclusions that the hog feed was 
contaminated with salmonella prior to delivery as the result of 
fecal material in the grain is corroborated by the expert opinion 
testimony of Paul Haderlie. Haderlie testified, without 
contradiction, to his former employment in the livestock feed 
processing business at plaintiff's Orem feed mill (Tr. at 37). 
Haderliefs expertise to evaluate livestock feed for 
composition and quality were accepted by the court without 
objection by plaintiff (Tr. at 37). s^e, 49 ALR2d 932 
Admissability of Opinion Evidence of Lay Witnesses as to Diseases 
and Physical Condition of Animals (1956) . Haderlie testified the 
the color and smell of the involved hog feed established that 
foreign material "screenings'1 had been blended into the hog feed 
by plaintiff's Orem feed mill (Tr. at 40, 43). Haderlie define 
screenings as all residue and matter extracted from the grain in 
the feed mill's cleaning processes (Tr. at 43). 
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Plaintiff's argument that the salmonella contamination 
in the hog feed could have originated only in the meat base 
product, Mr. Meaty Mix, is not supported by the evidence. 
Defendant agrees with plaintiff that salmonella is found 
generally in meats and meat base products rather than in grains 
and cereal compounds (Tr. at 144, 182). This general rule, 
however, both ignores and is displaced by the particular facts 
of this case. Replacement feed was ordered by defendant from 
Leland Milling Company on July 3, 1973 and July 7, 1973 (Tr. at 
45, 64). The Mr. Meaty Mix blended into this hog feed was from 
the same manufacturer's lot number as that which had been used by 
plaintiff in processing the June 25, 1973 hog feed order 
(Tr. at 201). Moreover, the hog feed processed by Leland Milling 
Company was readily accepted and consumed by defendent's hogs 
(Tr. at 203). Plaintiff's argument further ignores the rule of 
law that defendant's burden of proof does not require it to 
eliminate every possible cause. (see, cases cited infra.). 
It is also not persuasive that the hog farm to which 
plaintiff sold the involved bulk load of hog feed experienced no 
scours outbreak in its hogs. Dr. Hunter testified that defendant's 
farm bordered on a pathogen free operation with the result that 
defendant's hog had probable low immunities. The environment of 
defendant's farm therefore distinguished it from other hog farms 
in Utah County which did not maintain such medical controls. 
Consequently, such farms would have hogs with higher immunity levels 
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and likely did not possess the controls to identify the pathogen 
as did defendant (Tr. at 192). 
In conclusion, the motion for ..directed verdict granted 
to plaintiff was error as a matter of law. Both the existence of 
a warranty and its breach constitute issues of fact for jury 
determination. Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc., supra., and 
cases cited infra. Issues of fact for jury determination were 
properly created by the evidence from plaintiff's case in chief. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HELD ERRONEOUSLY THAT DEFENDANT INCURRED NO 
PROPERTY LOSS AND DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF PLAINTIFF'S SALE TO IT 
OF CONTAMINATED PROCESSED HOG FEED. 
No determination was ever extended by the trial court 
to the damages issue. The trial court's attention, as was that 
of plaintiff's motion for directed verdict, was directed solely 
toward the liability elements of defendant's warranty action. 
As a matter of law and within the rules of a motion for directed 
verdict, defendant's evidence in chief was sufficient to establisl 
an action for nominal damages. Jorritsma v. Farmer's Feed & 
Supply Co. Inc., 538 P2d 61, 17 UCC Rep 696 (Ore 1975). 
Defendant established the following kinds of 
property damage and loss amounts: 
(1) Loss of weight gain for 175 marketable hogs from 
July 7, 1973 to August 15, 1973; $2,205 
(Tr. at 49 - 58) 
(2) 42 hog deaths within feeder and weaner hog sizes 
from July to August, 1973; $1,260 
(3) 28 suckling pig deaths resulting from sows with 
litters being evacuated from hog house to outside 
by direction of Dr. Hunter in September, 1973; 
$580 
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(4) Veterinarian billings for treatment of scours 
epidemic; $281 
(5) Laboratory testing fees; $105 
(6) Pharmaceutical; $287.58 
(7) Employment of high school boys to assist 
defendant in housekeeping operations during 
scours epidemic; $848 
All damages designated above are consistent with a 
warranty action under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
UCA §70A-2-714., UCA §70A-2-715. It is to be noted that the 
basic breach of warranty damages formula within §70A-2-714(2) 
is not applicable to this action and must defer to §70A-2~715. 
In conclusion, defendant established elements of damages 
creating issues of fact for jury determination. The court's 
directed verdict against defendant was therefore error as to 
damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's motion for directed verdict granted 
by the court constituted error. The existence of a warranty, 
its breach, and resulting damages constitutes issues for the 
trier of fact under Utah case law and the majority rule. Triable 
issues of fact were property created from the evidence of 
defendant's case in chief upon its Counterclaim. 
C. C. Patterson 
and 
Philip C. Patterson 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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